City Lobbying and Member's Legislative Performance (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Why do cities spend scarce resources lobbying Congress? Existing theory suggests that cities lobby when there is a preference mismatch between local and state governments. Alternatively, I develop a theory of city lobbying that emphasizes the legislative performance of a city’s associated MC. Specifically, cities associated with lower performing legislators have greater lobbying needs than other cities. Using city-level data collected from 2003 to 2016, I find that, among cities nested inside the boundary of one congressional district, those linked to high-performing legislators are less likely to lobby than cities associated with low-performing legislators. Also, cities are less likely to lobby at the federal level if their associated legislators have high legislative power (chairing committees or serving on influential committees). A difference-in-differences analysis using redistricting provides additional support showing that legislator performance matters. These findings further our understanding of local politics and inter-governmental lobbying.
--- Paper presented at the 2022 APSA local political economy pre-conference, 2023 MPSA, 2023 Effective Lawmaking Conference, and University of Rochester's Brownbag Series.
Minority Staff and Bill Sponsorship in the U.S. House (Under Review, first view at the CEL working paper series)
--- Paper presented at the 2020 Congress&History Conference, 2021 APSA, and 2024 Representative Bureaucracy Workshop (MPSA).
Performance and Position: Legislator Ability and Budgetary Success (with Lawrence Rothenberg, Under Review)
Coordination and Information Transmission in Intergovernmental Lobbying (with Lawrence Rothenberg, submitted for a special issue at Publius)
Racial Gap: Evidence from Congressional Staff (presented at the 2021 Congress & History Conference, and 2021 APSA Annual Conference)