Working Papers:

Abstract: Why do cities spend scarce resources lobbying Congress? Existing theory suggests that cities lobby when there is a preference mismatch between local and state governments. Alternatively, I develop a theory of city lobbying that emphasizes the legislative performance of a city’s associated MC. Specifically, cities associated with lower performing legislators have greater lobbying needs than other cities. Using city-level data collected from 2003 to 2016, I find that, among cities nested inside the boundary of one congressional district, those linked to high-performing legislators are less likely to lobby than cities associated with low-performing legislators. Also, cities are less likely to lobby at the federal level if their associated legislators have high legislative power (chairing committees or serving on influential committees). A difference-in-differences analysis using redistricting provides additional support showing that legislator performance matters. These findings further our understanding of local politics and inter-governmental lobbying.

--- Paper presented at the 2022 APSA local political economy pre-conference, 2023 MPSA, 2023 Effective Lawmaking Conference, and University of Rochester's Brownbag Series. 

--- Paper presented at the 2020 Congress&History Conference, 2021 APSA, and 2024 Representative Bureaucracy Workshop (MPSA). 

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